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THE main goal of Red China in Latin America is to establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in that area. To do this she must identify the revolutionary struggles of the Latin-American people with Chinese revo-

lutionary tradition. Latin Americans must also be persuaded that Chinese revolutionary experience and strategy are applicable to their situation. Lacking normal diplomatic channels and copious economic resources, the Chinese have chosen to use an ideological

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ultimate objective, however, was "to do its best to support the struggle of the Latin American peoples and to promote friendship, unity, and cultural and economic exchange."

In Peking that same year, at a gathering of over 100 persons from 15 Latin-American countries in such fields as journalism, law, medicine, trade, and youth activities, Chinese experience was declared to be of extraordinary significance to all Latin America. Those present pledged to return and publicize their understanding of Communist China and her experience.

Success

Thus, by 1960 the Chinese Communists had achieved considerable success in their campaign of ideological penetration. Latin-American intellectuals who had visited Red China had come to identify their revolutionary movements with the Chinese revolution, convinced of the applicability of China's revolutionary model for them.

On their return to Latin America, these individuals gave talks, passed resolutions, and wrote articles and books expounding these views. By 1961, according to one account, 20 such books had been published in Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and Cuba. The Chinese, of course, were primarily interested in giving the Latin-American peoples an ideology and strategy for the conduct of their "national democratic" or "liberation" movements.

The Chinese Communists claim that pre-Communist China was, and Latin America is, semicolonial and semi-feudal in nature; thus, the Chinese revolution may point the way for the Latin-American people. As early as 1949, the year the People's Republic of China was founded, Chinese lead-

ers were already taking the view that their revolution indicated the road for all oppressed people of the world.

During the past 15 years, Peking has become increasingly convinced that the Chinese revolutionary experience is applicable to national democratic movements in all parts of the Afro-Asian-Latin-American world. Their way is claimed to be the only way for preindustrial, colonial, and semicolonial countries, just as the Russian Revolution is a classic model for industrialized imperialist countries.

The Chinese Way

Many Latin-American Communist leaders who have visited Red China express the same views, notably Victor de Merchan of Colombia, Luis Carlos Prestes of Brazil, and Alejandro Idrovo of Ecuador.

The view that Chinese revolutionary experience is applicable to Latin-American countries is not confined to these pro-Peking Communist leaders; certain fellow travelers and unlabeled individuals have also expressed the view that the Chinese way has much to offer Latin-American revolutionaries.

According to Peking, the essence of the Chinese way lies in Mao Tse-tung's integration of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete situation of the Chinese revolution. Since 1959 Mao's teachings have been circulated widely in pamphlets and books in Latin America. No effort has been spared to bring attention to Mao's revolutionary guidance and strategy for revolutions.

Two elements of Mao's teachings are emphasized as guides for the Latin-American national democratic movements—armed struggle and the united front. According to the Chi-

nese, a broad united front consisting of all segments and forces of the society, formed by an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and led by the Communist Party, is a prerequisite for the successful revolution.

The working class and its party have two tasks before them, the Chinese assert: to consolidate and unite labor organizations, first in a given

supposedly want land reform. The Chinese suggested in Havana in 1961 that it was imperative for the industrial workers and other progressive forces to assist the peasants in forming their own organizations, "take joint actions, and form an increasingly firmer alliance."

In addition to this alliance between the industrial workers and the peasants, the Chinese have consistently



A recent Chinese Communist exhibition at Santiago, Chile, was designed to enlarge Sino-Chilean cultural and economic ties

country and then in the whole of Latin America, and to form a close alliance with the peasantry so as to play a leading role in the organization and consolidation of a national united front. Area solidarity and cooperation, the Chinese argue, is crucial to the cause of the peoples of Latin America.

Chinese analysis of Latin America naturally gives heavy emphasis upon the peasantry as a major force in Latin-American national democratic movements. Peasants constitute about 70 percent of the area's population. The great majority are landless and

emphasized the importance of all progressive forces forming a broad united front. The Chinese are naturally pessimistic about the role of the *bourgeoisie* in any united front for national liberation. According to them, the *bourgeoisie* lack resolution and are guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States. Nonetheless, the Chinese urge the formation of a united front to include not only workers, peasants, and intellectuals, but also the *bourgeoisie*.

While an important purpose of the united front is to conduct legal struggles such as strikes and student dem-

onstrations, its even more important purpose is to serve as a base for extra legal action—armed struggle. Communist parties should not engage in a long series of legal struggles or launch hopeless urban uprisings; rather, they should begin armed struggles in the countryside which would later encompass the cities. This is the lesson of the Chinese revolution.

Before 1958 the Chinese did not think the Latin-American people were ready to employ armed uprisings in their revolutionary struggle, but the success of the Cuban revolution caused them to change their minds. In the Chinese concept, the Cuban revolution ushered in a new revolutionary era in Latin America—an era of armed struggle.

The Chinese note that, in the first part of 1959, peasants in Colombia, Bolivia, and Brazil, under Communist leadership, were using violence to take land and waging guerrilla warfare to oppose dictatorship. By 1962 guerrilla activities were afoot in 11 of Venezuela's 16 provinces, and armed conflict of varying kinds and degrees of seriousness had occurred in 10 other countries.

Cuban Experience

The emergence of Castro's Cuba is used by Peking as "proof" of the validity of Chinese analysis. According to the Chinese, the "26th of July" movement was victorious primarily because it had followed the line of armed struggle and the united front.

In terms of insurrectionary strategy, the Cuban revolution is described by Chinese writers as very close in character to the Chinese revolution. Both were armed struggles based on the masses and with bases in the villages; both used the countryside to

encircle the cities; and both finally seized the cities to establish political power.

The Cuban leaders abet this analysis by freely acknowledging their debt to Mao Tse-tung's teachings.

The establishment of political power, however, is not the end of a revolution—only its beginning. Identification of the Cuban with the Chinese revolution would not be complete had it used Maoist strategy to seize power but failed to consolidate the revolution and carry out national reconstruction.

Throughout 1959, therefore, the Chinese were urging the Cubans to embark immediately on changing the ownership of the means of production and bring about social reforms. Unless Cuba can "rid itself of American monopoly capital," they said, "it will be very difficult to develop her independent economy so as to insure her political independence." For their part, Cubans could not agree more.

Land Reform

The Chinese Communists greeted the 1959 Cuban proclamation on land reform with acclaim. The *People's Daily*, in an editorial of 28 July 1959, commented that land reform was "the basic content of Cuban national and democratic revolution" and that its proclamation was a fatal blow to the plantation system and foreign land ownership.

Chinese interests in the Cuban land reform is understandable. According to them, land reform has always been "the urgent demand of the broad masses of the Latin American people" but has been withheld from them primarily because of "the obstruction of the United States and various dictatorships." The Cuban example shows that land reform can be

achieved if they will only follow the experience first gained in Communist China.

In summary, Communist China now places primary emphasis on Latin America as an area pregnant with revolutionary possibilities and a key to the overthrow of US world power. Her early efforts were devoted essentially to laying the foundations for political penetration via an extensive cultural relations program attuned to political and labor leaders, intellec-

tuals, and all who might serve as sources of communications.

The Cuban revolution was a great boon to Peking since—whatever its true relation with Chinese Communist tactics—it could be used to advance the general Maoist formula for Latin America and inaugurate the revolutionary era. Peking, while limited in resources, intends to make Latin America, together with Africa, its next major target in world revolution.

